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ABSTRACT
Market-led approaches to European Monetary Union have been 
developed and proposed as a way to obtain monetary union without 
the problems involved in political-institutional approaches. The 
Parallel Currency Approach and the Evolutionary Approach are 
therefore supposed to obtain monetary union automatically and 
gradually without any substantial political harmonization. In this 
paper, however, it is argued that considerable political commitment 
is in fact also necessary for these approaches: that is, they can 
only be successful if they are backed by a corresponding legal 
framework which involves waiving sovereignty rights.
* Part of this work was done when I was affiliated with the Center for 
International Affairs at Harvard University. I would like to thank Peter 
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The consensus view is that the current European Monetary 
System (EMS) succeeded in creating a zone of monetary stability.1 
However the system will face a new challenge during the period of 
transition for the removal of capital controls which started mid 
1990. On the other hand monetary integration has to be seen as 
an integral part of the plans towards a single European market 
based on the Single European Act. In this context, reforms or at 
least some adjustments within the system seem to be unavoidable.
In contrast to the Delors Report2 which recommends following a 
strictly institutional approach to monetary union, some economists 
and politicians favour the so-called market-led approaches, which 
are at stake here.
Here it will be argued that the implementation of these 
approaches implies reforms of the present legal structure in the 
monetary field. Based on theoretical arguments and historical 
evidence it will be shown that the exclusive reliance on market 
forces without creating a sufficient legal framework for competition 
to work could lead to ambiguous results. It is unlikely that the 
outcome of currency competition would be the expected one.
1 See for instance De Grauwe and Peeters (1989), Giavazzi et. al. 
(1988), or McDonald and Zis (1989).
2 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union "Report 





























































































2. MARKET-LED APPROACHES TO MONETARY UNION
The market-led approaches to monetary union rely on market 
forces rather than on institutional developments in order to obtain 
monetary union. Although they share similar hopes in terms of 
market forces, they have different views about what the outcome of 
currency competition would be and therefore also divergent 
strategies. Moreover they have divergent definitions of what 
"monetary union" is.
2.1 The Parallel Currency Approach
The Parallel Currency Approach (PCA) was designed and first 
proposed by a group of economists in the All Saints’ Day 
Manifesto.3 4 The PCA was suggested as ideal because "...it is 
difficult to envisage a monetary union created by official edicts and 
legalistic structures. It must evolve on the market place." Instead 
of discretionary government decisions, reliance is placed on the 
automatic and gradual effects of market forces.
The main feature of the original PCA is the creation of an 
inflation-proof parallel currency, the Europa, which would be 
allowed to circulate freely side by side with the national currencies
3 See Basevi et. al. (1975). Many other works followed. For one of the 
most comprehensive treatments see Vaubel (1978).
4 Vaubel (1978, pp. 111-119) suggests indexed money. As a base for 
the index he discusses an asymmetric currency basket, in which the 




























































































of the Community. The advocates of the PCA assume agents will 
prefer the most stable money in terms of purchasing-power if they 
can choose among different currencies. Money in the form of cash 
does not bear interest and holding cash of an inflating currency 
involves higher opportunity costs than holding cash of a stable 
currency. Since the Europa is inflation-proof it would be the most 
preferred, hence it would quickly drive the national currencies out 
of circulation. The Europa would be the only remaining currency in 
the Community and monetary union would be obtained.
The concept of a parallel currency makes sense only in a 
intermediate stage of monetary union when different currencies are 
not perfect substitutes. Even with relatively fixed exchange rates 
plus capital mobility this may not be the case, if national financial 
markets and payments systems are not completely integrated.5 6
After setting up the present EMS, proposals were made for 
using the current European Currency Unit (ECU) as a parallel 
currency.6 Though the ECU as a basket currency with fixed 
currency shares will be less stable than the Europa would be, in 
an environment of generally low inflation rates the need for an 
"inflation-proof' new currency respectively for a reform of the ECU 
seemed to vanish. However, this modified approach is not 
motivated on economic grounds but by the political perception it 
were unlikely that, apart from the ECU, a new European currency 
could be created.
5 See Gros (1989b).




























































































2.2 The Evolutionary Approach7
The most recent market-led proposal for European Monetary 
Union was made by the UK Government with its Evolutionary 
Approach to Economic and Monetary Union [HM Treasury (1989)]. 
According to this approach the most important objectives of 
monetary union can be achieved within a competitive multi- 
currency system. These objectives include price and currency 
stability, low costs of financial transactions, and equal access to 
financial instruments and services by all borrowers and lenders in 
the EEC.
Only the first stage of the proposal laid down in the Delors 
Report [Committee (1989)] should be implemented; this would 
mainly involve the dismantling of barriers to the movement of 
people, goods and services and the liberalization of capital 
movements. According to the Evolutionary Approach, stage one 
would lead to an environment in which currency competition would 
not only become operational and increasingly effective but it would 
also support the results of stage one. The only two official 
measures beyond stage one would be the "complete removal of all 
unnecessary restrictions on the use of Community currencies" and
1 The proposal to allow currency competition without implying 
asymmetry between the national currencies and a European parallel 
currency was already discussed by Vaubel (1978). However, Vaubel 
concluded that since currency competition would lead to monopolization of 





























































































the removal of remaining barriers which burden costs and 
inconvenience on the exchange of Community currencies.8
Liberalized capital markets would lead to currency competition 
and be a powerful stimulus for monetary authorities to adopt low 
inflationary policies. Potential capital outflows and currency 
substitution would ensure tight monetary policies. The result would 
be stable prices and therefore convergent stable exchange rates. 
The liberalization in the field of financial services and the 
reduction in uncertainty of prices and exchange rates would lead to 
lower costs and a Community-wide integrated payment system.
The whole argument follows Hayek’s proposal for currency 
competition [Hayek (1976, 1978)]. The only difference between his 
proposal and the UK proposal seems to be that the UK proposal 
narrows competition to government issued money, whereas Hayek 
proposed also to allow private agents to issue money.
In the view of the Evolutionary Approach monetary union would 
not have to involve a single European currency but a competitive 
multi-currency system with interchangeable Community currencies. 
This definition of monetary union does not harmonize with 
conventional definitions, which would, at least, require the fixing of 
exchange rate parities or the development of a single currency.9
8 HM Treasury (1989, paragraphs 21 and 22).





























































































3. THE ECONOMICS OF CHOICE IN CURRENCY
The Parallel Currency Approach and the Evolutionary Approach 
predict different outcomes of currency competition: the Parallel 
Currency Approach expects the EPC to replace the national 
currencies of the Community over time, while the Evolutionary 
Approach postulates coexistence between (stable) national 
currencies.
These conclusions seem to be contradictory, but they may not 
necessarily be exclusive. Both results seem in general feasible, 
depending on the legal framework in which currencies compete. 
Before we proceed to study these structures, we will in general 
(that is without legal restrictions) discuss the factors which make 
monies attractive for economic agents as media of exchange, units 
of account, and as stores of value.
Let us define money as an asset which, unlike other assets, can 
be used as a medium of exchange.10 In an ideal Arrow-Debreu 
world there would be no need for such media of exchange; all 
economic agents would be completely informed and therefore able 
to make contracts and to undertake exchanges without any 
additional costs.
10 This definition of money conforms with what is usually understood 
as money. According to Menger (1909, p. 600) the main feature of money 
is its ability to serve as a medium of exchange. He writes: "Was das Geld 
von allen übrigen Marktgiitern unterscheidet .. und somit seinen 
allgemeinen Begriff bestimmt, ist seine Funktion als allgemein 
gebrâuchlicher Vermittler des Güteraustausches." For a discussion see also 




























































































In the real world holding and using money makes sense since 
frictions prevent people from making direct and costless 
transactions. Monies serve as universal media of exchange which 
bridge exchanges across agents and across time in a decentralized 
market. It is obvious that for bridging the gap between receipts 
and payments, money serves as store of value although this is a 
function which monies have in common with other assets.
Suppose that in our economy a small number of different 
monies are supplied by different institutions, called "central banks" 
in the absence of any legal restrictions on the use of these monies 
and the supply of new monies. Then agents’ behaviour will 
determine not only whether the different monies coexist in serving 
their respective functions but also whether non-interest bearing 
monies (cash) will be used side by side with interest bearing 
monies (deposits) and other financial assets as media of exchange.
3.1 Choice of Units of Account and Stores of Value
The issue of competition among financial assets and units of 
account is well covered by traditional monetary theory. Based on 
the interest parity theorem [Fisher (1896), Gebauer (1982)] these 
approaches explain the conditions of market equilibrium with 
several assets.11
11 Fisher (1896) only discussed the irrelevance of the choice of 
different standards of value under perfect foresight. For an extension to 
the case with flexible exchange rates (open economy) under uncertainty 




























































































If we consider perfect foresight and flexible exchange rates, 
market forces ensure that exchange rate adjustments exactly 
mirror different inflation rates and these would be reflected in 
different interest rates, thus the interest parity theorem would 
hold. Agents would be indifferent in their choices of debt standards 
and store of values. It would not matter in what currency to invest 
or in what unit to contract, since future developments of the values 
of the different currencies are known and the differences of these 
developments are reflected in different nominal returns or different 
nominal contracts.
Under uncertainty, future inflation rates, devaluation rates and 
interest rates are no longer known. Economic agents will have to 
base their decisions on expectations about the future values of 
these variables and market exchange rates will reflect these 
valuations. Provided the inflation rates are anticipated correctly by 
economic agents, they could still be indifferent between different 
standards and assets with identical maturities and default risks.
For this reason the level of inflation observed for different 
currencies may not have an influence on the choice of the debt 
standard or the denomination of assets per se, although it has an 
important indirect effect via its predictability. Empirical 
observations tell us the higher the rate of inflation, the more 
volatile and unpredictable it will be.12 Therefore, an asset 
denominated in a currency unit which is expected to inflate more
12 This view is shared by McDonald and Zis (1989, p. 191), Klein and 
Melvin (1982), and Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1984). For empirical 




























































































than others will have to earn a nominal interest rate higher than 
the difference in inflation rate expectations would imply. If it does 
not earn a risk premium it will not be demanded - hence, its price 
will fall, i.e. its return will rise until the risk premium required by 
the market is paid.
There is no a priori reason to believe that securities 
denominated in more inflating accounting units will disappear as 
long as the inflation rate is moderate and a corresponding risk 
premium is paid on investments denominated in these units. Only 
in the case of hyperinflation, when buying a bond denominated in 
the inflating currency becomes more a gamble than an investment, 
will it be avoided.
For the choice of an accounting unit similar considerations have 
to be taken into account. However, even if the inflation rates could 
be perfectly foreseen, inflating accounting units could imply menu 
cost, i.e. costs for printing new price lists. Hence, if menu costs are 
significant, preference will be given to the most stable accounting 
unit.
When choosing a debt contract menu cost are not likely to be 
important and choices are made according to selecting assets. But 
here, unlike the case of buying and selling an asset in a big 
market, the two individual attitudes towards risks of creditor and 
debtor have to match and will determine what the accounting unit 
will be. All risk-return combinations available in the market for 




























































































3.2 Choice of media of exchange
The quality of a money to serve as a means of payment is 
inherently linked to its store-of-value quality. As media of exchange 
(cash) do not explicitly bear interest, the rate of devaluation (or 
appreciation!) is crucial.
Competition among a number of different media of exchange is 
often rejected because the well known Greshams’ law13 tells us that 
in a multi-currency system under certain circumstances "bad money 
drives out good money". Given a fixed disequilibrium exchange rate 
between the "good" and the "bad" money, the bad money will buy an 
equal amount of commodities as the good money, but the good money 
is more valuable in other markets. A simple arbitrage effect leads to 
the use of the undervalued good money in alternative ways; the good 
money will be stored, exported or melted.
In a system with floating exchange rates, markets are supposed 
to find the equilibrium exchange rate between different currencies. 
According to the interest parity theorem in equilibrium, the expected 
change in the exchange rate among two monies (both with a zero 
nominal interest rate and the same degree of liquidity) is related to 
their rates of inflation. Real interest rates are equalized through 
devaluation of the more inflating currency against the more stable 
one.
13 Mann (1982, p. 19) gives a concise description of Gresham’s Law and 




























































































If agents in an economy with two media of exchange of identical 
liquidity expect that currency A will inflate more than currency B 
continuously over the next year, they will avoid holding currency 
A. Thus currency A will be sold against currency B since agents 
try to prevent losses of wealth. This will push the market value of 
A lower until its equilibrium exchange rate is reached.
Some economists14 claim that with flexible exchange rates the 
so-called anti-Greshams’ law holds, that is "good money drives out 
bad money" and therefore all currencies but the one with the 
lowest (expected) inflation will be driven out. Indeed, especially 
when monies are fiat monies without direct value in consumption, 
their demand depends basically on their expected future value. In 
extreme cases the underestimation of the experienced depreciation 
of a currency may then lead to a loss of credibility in its stability. 
Agents with positive expectations elasticities will expect further 
depreciations and act accordingly.15
In cases where the expected devaluation rates are moderate it 
seems to be more likely that the exchange rates mechanism will 
adjust adequately to find the market equilibrium. Only during the 
process of adjustment will the market share of a "weak" currency 
suffer, since it is sold against the others. With substitutable monies
14 See e.g. Brunner and Meltzer (1971) and Vaubel (1977 and 1978).
15 Expectations elasticity is defined as the ratio between the 
proportional rise in the expected future price of good x to the proportional 
rise in its current price [Hicks (1946, p. 204)]. See also De Long et. al. 





























































































the respective central bank will certainly react in order to prevent 
future losses of its market-share and profits.16
In reality the devaluation of a transaction medium is only one 
of the factors which determines its demand, though an important 
one. If one of the monies is more widely accepted than the other it 
will be demanded even if its devaluation rate, i.e. the opportunity 
costs of holding it, is higher. People will be willing to pay more for 
it because it is "more money" than the others.17 In fact, in some 
cases a currency of similar stability may be crowded out because it 
cannot compete with its "moneyness" or marketability.
However, references to experiences in countries with very high 
inflation rates in which, despite large inflation differentials, 
significant currency substitution is not observable are in most cases 
not appropriate.18 The illegality of using foreign money rather than 
the high moneyness of the domestic currency or the inconvenience 
of using another currency is likely to be the main explanation.
With regard to transaction costs it would be better to have a 
single currency. The great advantage of having only one money lies 
in the ease of comparison and transaction when everything is
16 See Girton and Roper (1981, pp. 20-26) on possible supply side 
reactions.
17 This aspect is ignored by Padoa-Schioppa and Papadia (1984). 
They argue that the international use of a money only depends on its 
quality, e.g. its rate of inflation.
18 Gros (1989a, p. 191) argues, that currency substitution does not 




























































































denominated in terms of the same thing. These advantages might 
not be completely lost if prices were marked in terms of all 
currencies. Nevertheless an important question is, whether 
currencies in a competitive multi-currency system can coexist, or 
whether the system will converge towards a uni-currency system. 
To analyze this we will have to distinguish competition between 
established national currencies and new forms of currencies from 
competition between almost equally established currencies.
In the latter case Klein (1974) believes that the costs of valuing 
and money changing are so large that a single dominant money 
would emerge. The large costs of exchanging currency would seem 
to deter individuals from using more than one currency 
contemporaneously for everyday retail transactions. Cobham (1989, 
p. 213) on the other hand is more sceptical. He agrees that a 
single currency would be optimal but remarks that the economy 
may not arrive at the optimal point.
However, different currencies might be used in different sectors 
of the economy; for example, the wholesale financial sector, which 
has lower transaction costs, might use an international currency, 
whereas the retail sector which has higher transaction costs, might 
use the domestic currency.19
If we consider currency competition through the elimination of 
barriers for new currencies in an economy where an established 
currency already exists, the outcome will be different. According to




























































































Klein and Melvin (1982) in this case it is quite unlikely that the 
established money will be displaced by a competing one especially 
if the established currency is reasonably stable.
On the one hand established monies are already in use and 
therefore more marketable than a new one, on the other hand by 
being in the market for a while the national currency might have 
built up a good reputation, or in other words, it may have created 
a brand name20. Hence, a newly created money has a comparative 
disadvantage in relation to the established monies since it does not 
have a historical dimension. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether 
these disadvantages are always strong enough to prevent other 
media to enter the market.
3.3 Vertical Currency Competition
Without legal restrictions on the intermediation of money some 
forms of assets may develop having features which make them 
useable as media of exchange, thus those assets would be (interest- 
bearing) monies. The choice among non-interest bearing monies 
(which we call cash) as media of exchange cannot be separated 
from the availability of interest-bearing monies (assets). The 
question arises whether in a competitive environment non-interest 
bearing monies can coexist with interest bearing monies. This 
question can be answered affirmatively.
20 Currency competition by the means of brand name quality of a 




























































































Even in the absence of legal restrictions21 different forms of 
money and assets have different degrees of liquidity, hence in an 
efficient market the most liquid form of money can sustain the 
lowest (zero) rate of return and will still be demanded.22 
Nevertheless, "vertical" currency competition can be expected to 
lead to substitutions between different assets with different levels 
of liquidity, whenever the spread in rates of returns do not reflect 
their differences in their liquidity. As long as frictions exist we can 
expect that competition is not eliminating cash holdings. Cash can 
coexist with interest-bearing monies because it is more liquid. 
However, competition may urge the central banks to pay implicit 
interest on these "non-interest bearing" forms of money (cash) and 
shift the equilibrium combinations of return and liquidity to a 
higher level.
In this context Hicks’ (1935) classical explanation for the 
existence of money (cash) is to extreme. According to Hicks utility 
maximizing individuals will economize their cash holding by 
transferring low yield assets into higher yielding assets whenever 
possible, but transaction costs will prevent them from reaching a 
point of zero-cash holding. Hicks (p. 19) explains: "The most 
obvious sort of friction, and undoubtly one of the most important,
21 According to Bryant (1989) and Wallace (1983) legal restrictions on 
the intermediation of money are the only substantial reason for the 
existence of return-dominated money.
22 In contrast with the advocates of the Legal Restrictions Theory of 
Money, White (1987, pp. 451-452) argues that interest-bearing bonds and 





























































































is the cost of transferring assets from one form to another ... Thus 
a person is deterred from investing money for short periods, partly 
because of brokerage charges and stamp duties, partly because it is 
not worth the bother."
Although Hicks is right in describing the behaviour of the 
demand side for a given supply structure, he does not consider 
dynamics of the supply side which will occur in a competitive 
system. If intermediation is profitable, assets with other 
combinations of liquidity and return will be offered, hence the 
demand side will also react. By doing so the newly created assets 
will become more liquid and in the end the market will offer a 
continuum of different assets useable as media of exchange which 





























































































4. COMPETING CURRENCIES: HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
Contemporary experiences with currency competition under flexible 
exchange rates are limited to international payments. On the 
domestic scale currency competition is not only limited to fixed 
exchange rates but also restricted to a very few areas (e.g. credit 
cards). Therefore for empirical work on multi-currency systems only 
historical experience can be used to find some answers to the 
questions addressed:
(1) Did the competitive supply of money tend to lead to a single
currency because anti-Gresham’s law was at work?
(2) Did new forms of money enter the market easily?
(3) Did the legal tender legislation have an influence on the choice
in currency?
4.1 Competing Currencies in the Pre-Suffolk System
The monetary system of Massachusetts from 1800 to 1824 provides 
valuable information on the operation of a relatively unrestricted 
multiple currency system with flexible exchange rates. In 1824 a 
clearinghouse system, the so-called Suffolk system, was established 
and all Massachusetts paper money became accepted at par. Almost 





























































































Besides gold and silver coins, which were legal tender23, bank 
notes issued by the State-banks24 and notes issued by the First 
Bank (1791-1811) and later by the Second Bank of the United 
States (1816-1836) served as media of exchange. Bank notes 
typically sold at varying discounts, according to the financial 
standing of the bank by which they were issued and the distance 
the bills had to be sent for redemption. Hepburn (1915, p. 104) 
estimated the average costs of sending in the money home for 
redemption to country banks at less than 1 %. Therefore 
differences in discounts of bank notes of 1 % or more between 
banks in Massachusetts can be explained by differences in the 
financial standing of the banks concerned.
Table 1 gives an idea of the extent to which discounts applied 
(in Philadelphia) for bank notes issued in Massachusetts and other 
areas.
In 1816 the ratio of circulating coins to circulating bank notes 
for the entire US was on average about 1:10 [Secretary (1856, p. 
51)]. In New England the bank notes were almost entirely supplied 
by State Banks, while the notes of the Second Bank of the United 
States, like the notes of the First Bank before it, played only a
23 See Sumner (1874, pp. 57-58). The Federal Constitution stated that 
no State shall "coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold 
or silver coin a tender in payments of debts".
24 The term State bank refers to banks chartered by a State; 
according to the Federal Constitution from 1787 States were not allowed 




























































































Table 1: Prices of bank notes and the Mexican Gold $ in 
Philadelphia quoted in terms of Philadelphia bank notes 











6.10.1817 par - - -2 +1
2.10.1820 -1/-2 -3/-5 -4 -1/-3 par
1.10.1825 -1 -2 -2 -1.5 +1.5
7.10.1826 -1 -2.5 -2.5 -1.5/-3 +0.5
1.12.1827 -1 -1 -1.5 -1.5/-2.5 -
Remark: These prices are the average prices of bank notes issued in the 
era mentioned and the Mexican gold Dollar in Philadelphia in 
relation to Philadelphia bank notes. Prices of some bank notes 
were higher or lower if more information about the financial 
standing of the respective bank was known.
Source: Elliot’s Funding System (1845) Doc. No. 15, 28th Congr. 1st Sess.
Sec. No. 142: "Mr. Woodbury’s Rates of Exchange, and Prices of 
Bank Notes", pp. 1103-1119.
minor role. The fact that the Second Bank issued no notes of a 
denomination less than ten dollars created a comparative 
disadvantage in serving as media of exchange against the State 
bank notes, some of which were denominated even in fractional 
parts of the dollar [Secretary (1856, p. 56)]. The notes of the 
Second Bank should therefore be considered as complements to the 





























































































(1) The development of the market-shares of the banks in 
Massachusetts at the time concerned clearly rejects anti-Gresham’s 
law. Table 2 and the graph demonstrate that no concentration 
towards one or a small number of currencies was observable. On 
the contrary, the number of different currencies increased. The 
circulation of the five biggest banks as in 1803, who then held a 
market-share of more than 80 %, decreased relatively and 
absolutely. If these banks had belonged to the weak banks they 
should have been driven out of the market, if they had belonged to 
the strong banks they should have prevented new banks from 
coming in.
Although we do not have exact data on the purchasing power 
stability of individual bank notes the mere fact that exchange rates 
were flexible and adjusted over time is sufficient to claim that the 
strongest currency did not drive out all weaker ones.
One could object that the banks faced decreasing returns to 
scale after reaching a certain size due to the technology available 
at that time, so it was relatively easier for new banks to enter the 
market than for old banks to expand their circulation. This view is 
not supported by the empirical findings. As the data show, the five 
biggest banks lost more than half their circulation after 1803. As 
the banks before 1803 also operated in a competitive environment 
it is very unlikely that they produced at a level 100 % above their 
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(2) New currencies entered the market and gained reasonable 
market share relatively quickly. Between 1803 and 1806 the 
number of banks grew from seven to fifteen and reached 33 in 
1822. This increase cannot be explained by a demand shift for 
more currency the existing banks could not supply, but by 
increasing competition, as the absolute decrease of the circulation 
of the four biggest banks from 1803 shows. As already mentioned, 
decreasing returns to scale are unlikely to be the reason for the 
success of the new banks.
(3) The legal tender status of gold and silver coins did not 
prevent bank notes from being the main media of exchange. In fact 
90 % of all media of exchange were not legal tender.
When transferring historical experiences into contemporary 
Europe one should, of course, be cautious about their applicability. 
In our case the main economic difference between early 19th 
century Massachusetts and Europe today is the availability of 
information and technology.
Relative to findings (1) and (2), despite the poor availability of 
information new currencies were able to enter the market and 
economic agents managed to use a respective number of currencies 
side by side. Because of fewer information problems today, the 
market for media of exchange is even less likely to monopolize. The 
availability of advanced technology nowadays has certainly led to 




























































































minimum. But considering the volume of money issued by each 
national central bank at present, even if there were now increasing 
returns to scale, the average costs and marginal costs would hardly 
differ and would not be a drive towards concentration. With respect 
to finding (3), the difference of the availability of information and 
technology can be neglected.
5. LEGAL RESTRICTIONS AND 
THE DEMAND FOR MONEY
In the real world, choices of assets and currencies are 
substantially influenced by the legal system.25 The legal system 
supplies a framework which directs the demand for currencies or 
assets in either way, it enforces the use of certain media (e.g. by 
defining a legal tender) and prohibits or discourages the use of 
other media (e.g. through capital controls).
25 The maxim "money is a creature of the State" was discussed with 
enthusiasm in the early 19th century in Austria and Germany. The 
Austrian economists, especially Karl Menger (1892 and later works) 
argued that money evolved according to market forces whereas Knapp 
(1921) overemphasised the role of the State. Recently the legal restriction 
theory of money criticizes government intervention as the main reason why 





























































































5.1 Legal Tender Legislation
One of the most striking state intervention in the business of 
money is the determination of a legal tender. Nussbaum (1950, p. 
45) defines such means of payments as legal tender which the 
creditor is not privileged to refuse if it is offered by a debtor in 
payment of his debt. Mann (1982, p. 6) places emphasis on the fact 
that the choice lies more with/ the creditor by saying "In the 
absence of the creditor’s consent, express or implied, debts cannot 
be discharged otherwise than by the payment what the law 
considers as money, namely legal tender."26
In the case of the Federal Republic of Germany, unlimited legal 
tender are the notes of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The legal tender 
status of federal coins is limited; coins denominated in DM 
(Deutsche Mark) cannot be refused to settle a debt up to an 
amount of DM 20,-- and coins denominated in Pfennige must be 
accepted up to an amount of DM 5 ,-.27 As a consequence of these 
laws even a creditor of claims of thousands of marks must accept 
notes rather than a cheque or a transfer to his bank account but 
may also insist to be paid in legal tender.
For the UK the legislation determines that gold coins are legal 
tender for any amount, while coins of denominations of more than 
10 pence are legal tender only for payments of amounts up to £
26 For a similar definition see Walker (1980).
27 Wahrungsgesetz of the Federal Republic § 1, art. 2; Bundesbank- 




























































































10. Coins of smaller denominations must be accepted for payments 
of amounts not exceeding £ 5 and bronze coins for amounts up to 
20 pence.28
Penalties for the repudiation of legal tender have not existed in 
central European during the last two hundred years [Nussbaum 
(1950, pp. 45 ff.)]. Creditors who do not accept legal tender from a 
debtor to settle a debt usually need only to face damage due to 
private law legislation.29
Still, history knows of interesting cases of severe penalties for 
the non-acceptance of legal tender. In the American colonies 
repudiators of continental bills issued by Congress in the 1780s 
were punished by forfeiture and sometimes imprisonment30 while 
early English law punished non-acceptance of legal tender as lese- 
majeste. The hardest punishment known was imposed on rejecting 
state paper money during the French Revolution and on rejection 
of imperial money in 13th century China; in both cases the death 
penalty was imposed.31
However, it would be illusionary to expect that the existence of 
a legal tender alone has much influence on the persistent
28 Currency and Bank Notes Act, 1954; Coinage Act, 1971.
29 In the Federal Republic the non-acceptance of legal tender by a 
creditor would be considered as a creditor’s default of acceptance 
(G la ubigerverzug)(B urgcr]ich es  Gesetzbuch §§ 293 ff.).
30 See Dewey (1986, pp. 38-39).





























































































dominance of the state money against competing media of 
exchange. The impact of legal tender legislation is limited to cases 
where agents do not agree upon how a claim is to be settled. The 
historical experiences show that the sole existence of a legal tender 
did not prevent that 90 % of the media of exchange in use were 
not legal tender. Alternative media are very likely to be accepted if 
their exchange rates to the legal tender corresponds to their 
relative market value and if no penalties are imposed.
Other restrictions such as the denomination of debts in 
ambiguous cases, the denomination of tax payments and other 
compulsory levies, and the denomination of financial statements 
seem to have a much stronger impact on the preferences for a 
particular currency.
5.2 Forced Tender
By fixing a particular currency for payment of taxes and for all 
contracts with state authorities a government has a strong 
influence on the choice in currency by economic agents. Even Hayek 
(1978, p. 36) to a certain degree admits that the state should be 
allowed to fix such a currency, which is forced tender. Nonetheless 
Hayek claims that other units of accounting should be allowed for 
assessment of taxes. This is not the case in western States, where 
government expenditure quotas reach almost 50 %. There the 




























































































advantage to all other media of exchange. As Lerner (1947, p. 313) 
expressed it:
"The modern state can make anything it chooses generally 
acceptable as money ...If the state is willing to accept the 
proposed money in payment of taxes and other obligations to 
itself the trick is done. Everyone who has obligations, and all 
other people will be willing to accept the pieces of paper with 
which he can settle the obligations, and all other people will 
be willing to accept these pieces of paper because they know 
that the tax payers etc. will accept them in turn."
Legal restrictions upon the use of non-government money makes 
government money more liquid. Hence, the demand for portfolio- 
dominated assets (£, DM, etc.) arises not only because these assets 
have higher liquidity per se but also because legal barriers restrict 
the use of other assets for many transactions and settlement 
purposes. According to the legal restrictions theory of money these 
restrictions are sufficient to explain the coexistence paradoxon, that 
is the coexistence of interest bearing assets with non-interest 
bearing forms of money.
However, the view of Wallace (1983), who argues that without 
legal restrictions "it is hard to see why anyone would hold non- 
interest-bearing currency instead of interest-bearing securities” 
cannot be accepted.32 If the non-interest bearing (government) 
currency is the most liquid medium of exchange even without legal 
restrictions it still would be demanded. In other words, legal 
restrictions widen the wedge between the returns on generally
32 Although Wallace is stressing more the role of restrictions in the 





























































































accepted media of exchange and other less liquid assets but they do 
not create it.
Even if legal restrictions were be the only important explanation 
for the coexistence of money and assets, the conclusion that their 
removal would lead to a disappearance of government money would 
also not be valid. Rather one should expect that because 
government money has become generally accepted and widespread 
it will persist for these reasons (at least for a considerable period of 
time).
In addition to the determination of the currency in which tax 
and similar payments have to be made, in some countries there are 
also restrictions concerning the use of alternative units of account 
in private contracts. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for 
example, two residents cannot contract in a foreign currency unless 
special permission is granted by the Central Bank.33 This regulation 
seems to be irreconcilable with legislation on legal tender, but it is 
not. "The only method of invalidation stipulations providing for 
payment in a foreign currency is express legislation" [Mann (1982, 
p. 197)].
Just to mention a second example of restrictions in the Federal 
Republic: index clauses on the DM are usually not allowed and
33 Wahrungsgesetz § 3. This rule was originally also applied to 





























































































need also special permission by the Deutsche Bundesbank.34 This 
permission was in fact necessary before the ECU obtained the 
status of a foreign currency in Germany. Before the permission 
was given by the Bundesbank, residents in Germany were not 
allowed to have ECU deposits in Germany.
The economic constraints of the restrictions mentioned so far are 
rather obvious: the national currency is more in demand than it 
would be in a laisser-faire environment.
5.3 Capital Controls
In addition to state enforcement of the use of certain media of 
exchange and other restrictions concerning the use of alternative 
units of account, there can be substantial restrictions on the use of 
non-domestic monies as a store of value.
In our case the most important restrictions are those on the 
transfer of funds across borders and the right to keep accounts at 
home in foreign currency. These restrictions reduce the asset 
substitutability and prevent exchange rates from reflecting the 
intrinsic values of the currencies [Gebauer (1986)]. Although the 
most significant ones of these restrictions were removed in most 
member states this year, they had substantial impact on the 
demand for alternative assets in the past.
34 Wahrungsgesetz § 3. This rule is usually seen as necessary to 




























































































History shows that whenever regulations where set up against 
the interest of economic agents, tendencies to by-pass them could be 
observed. Successful examples are the emergence of black markets, 
the development of financial innovations and the emergence of 
completely new markets like the Euro-markets,35
Hence, the very existence of exchange restrictions can be seen as 
an important reason for the ECU’s success in France and in Italy.36 37
The best indications of this are the differentials between the 
Eurolira and Eurofranc and domestic interest rates especially prior 
to intra-EMS exchange rate realignments. The reduction of the 
differences in volatility between the Euro rates and the domestic 
rates of the Franc and the Lira after some restrictions were 
removed also support our argument.3’
On the other hand, according to Gros (1989a, p. 56) "... the 
limited use of the ECU in West Germany and Switzerland suggests 
that the existence of the ECU does not have important implications 
in capital markets that are already liberalized." The conclusion of
35 The first "Euro-dollars" were deposited in banks outside of the U.S. 
mainly because of R egu la tion  Q  which laid down that banks were not 
allowed to pay interest on deposits of maturities of less than 30 days. In 
the meantime this regulation was eliminated [Board of Governors (1985)].
36 See e.g. McDonald and Zis (1989, pp. 193 f.). This view is also 
shared by Bordo and Schwartz (1989, p. 5).





























































































De Grauwe and Peeters (1989)38, that the ECU’s success in the 
international bond market has been moderate compared with other 
currencies, is therefore not surprising.39
6. IMPLICATIONS FOR A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK
As we have seen, there are some convincing reasons to believe 
that stable, and therefore more predictable, currencies are more 
preferred than others. Assuming no other measures will be 
implemented, the removal of capital controls during the period of 
transition (mid 1990-end 1992) will enforce competition between the 
national currencies. This competition is quite likely to put some 
pressure on monetary policy and inflation rates in Europe. But for 
the same reason it is also likely, that in the absence of controls the 
role of the ECU as a investment currency will not improve.
Our analysis has shown that in an unregulated system it is not 
likely that the market forces will lead to a single currency. 
However, since currency competition is very sensitive relative to the 
institutional environment it takes place existing regulations have to
38 Their view contrasts with that of Lomax (1989), who compares the 
growth of the ECU bond market with E u ro-m arkets only to conclude that 
the ECU has been successful.
39 Gebauer (1986, p. 115), however, remarks, that in future the 
removal of capital controls might increase the demand for ECU. 
Monetary policies will have to be more restrictive, hence the ECU will 
become more stable. If the tendency to diversify currency portfolios 




























































































be taken into account. In order to be successful, the market-led 
approaches therefore need correcting "legal support".
6.1 The Parallel Currency Approach
In the case of the Parallel Currency Approach, the ECU would 
have to be strengthened in order to create a comparative advantage 
relative to the national currencies. From a pure investment 
currency the ECU should be developed to become a medium of 
exchange. Barriers to the use of the ECU for these function need to 
be removed. Whereas extensions of options to use the ECU as an 
accounting unit outside of the EC institutions in the Community 
countries seem not to difficult to implement, the granting of legal 
tender status and the abolishment of the forced tender privileges of 
national currencies will be so.
The ECU could be given a preferential legal tender status40 and 
equal rights to be used as forced tender side by side with national 
currencies, i.e. contracts denominated in any national currency 
could be settled in ECU but not vice versa in order to improve the 
demand for the ECU. This would, like in the case of a non- 
preferential legal tender status of the ECU, require well-defined 
legal exchange rates between each national money and the ECU.




























































































These legal exchange rates could be adjusted daily and be valid 
for a day. However, even if the adjustments from day to day are 
only very small in such a system with quasi-fixed exchange rates 
spreads between legal and market exchange rates could not be 
prevented. Depending on expectations about the next daily 
adjustment arbitrage would be undertaken. Thus, Gresham’s Law 
would be at work - the "bad" money would be used as a transaction 
medium and the "good" one would be sold at the market exchange 
rate.
If the quasi-fixed exchange rate system is going to be changed, 
one might prefer to have a flexible legal exchange rate to prevent 
Gresham’s Law from working. From a practical point of view this 
seems difficult to manage since substantial informational problems 
would arise. If these problems cannot be solved, the ECU will not 
have a chance to become a successful parallel currency.
6.2 The Evolutionary Approach
For the Evolutionary Approach the some objectives would be 
attained without the extension of legislation on legal tender and 
forced tender. Still, competitive pressure among the Community 
currencies would be much more effective if they are extended to the 
area of transactions media. In any case restrictions on the use of 




























































































To implement the Evolutionary Approach to a full extent, legal 
tender and, more important, forced tender status would have to be 
awarded to all Community currencies in all member countries. The 
respective national currency should no longer be the exclusive 
forced tender for government contracts and tax payments. 
Otherwise competition would not take place to a full extent.
This may create substantial problems. On the one hand, mutual 
recognition of currencies is politically rather unlikely [e.g. Gros 
(1989a, p. 226)]. Factually, the political commitment necessary for 
this can be seen already as half way toward an agreement upon a 
big-leap towards a single currency. On the other hand, if there 
would be no mutual recognition, because of reasons mentioned in 
sections three and five competition among (stable) transaction 
media in a certain territory will not have much effect on the 
market shares of established local currencies since only local 
currencies could be used universally. Nevertheless, the displacement 
of national currencies is not necessary to achieve monetary union as 
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